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Setting Limits. Medical Technology
and The Law
GEORGE P SMITH, 11"

1.

Introduction

In the May 1959 Rede Lecture at the University of Cambridge, CP Snow
articulated his thesis that contemporary society is composed of two competing or
clashing cultures: the (literary) intellectuals and the scientists. 1Since science is not
a subject presented easily to the public through literature (for example, journals,
books, newspapers, magazines), the self-proclaimed intellectuals ignore the value
and importance of the ideas science seeks to promote. Thus, the 2scientific ethic
remains largely invisible as an understandable intellectual activity.
In the second edition of The Two Cultures, published in 1963, Snow suggests
the emergence of a new third culture which will close the communication gap
between the intellectuals and the scientists and would thus be seen as new public
intellectuals or synthesisers. 3 They 4will be interpreters of the ideas and values of
the continuing scientific revolution.
The central purpose of this paper is to question the extent to which law can
assume an active role as a third culture in complementing and translating, if not
blending, the other two cultures - all in an effort to provide a framework for
principled decision-making for complex biotechnological and medical issues in
the 2 1st century. Is this task too daunting for law?
Grant Gilmore observed that 'the body of the law, at any time or place, is an
unstable mass in precarious equilibrium'. 5 US Chief Justice Warren E Burger
observed that '[t]he law does not search out as do science and medicine; it reacts
to social needs and demands'. 6 And, in Australia, in 1970, long before the pace of
medical and biotechnological science had quickened to the level it is today, Justice
keeping pace with medicine and, indeed,
Windeyer opined that the law was not
7
marched 'in the rear', limping along.
Today, these three observations have relevance and, indeed, shape the contours
of this paper. More specifically, they raise informed caveats to the feasibility of a
* Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. I am grateful for

the student research assistance of Ben Yhim in preparing part of Section 4 of this paper.
Charles P Snow. The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959).
Ibid.
Charles P Snow. The Two Cultures: AndA Second Look (1963).
Ibid. See generally John Brockman (ed), The Third Culture: Scientists on the Edge (1995).
Grant Gilmore, The Alges of American Law (1977) at110.
Warren E Burger, 'Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine' in George P Smith. II (ed),
Ethical. Legal and Social Challenges to a Brave New World (1982).
7 Mount Isa Mines Ltd vPuse (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 395 (Windeyer J).
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full partnership between medical technology and law as the new Age of Science
develops in this, the 2 1st century. 8 At the same time, they raise a level of needed
concern for the social effects of legal institutions, legal precepts and legal doctrines
as they interplay with developing medical technologies. 9 For cosmic utopians,
medical science and technology are seen as forces to achieve a 'total liberation of
mankind'. 10 Contrariwise, catastrophists suggest, with alarm, that the limits of
science have been met already.'1

2.

Macro Standards of Evaluation

Two levels of analysis must be pursued in order to test whether limitations should be
imposed upon medical science. One level involves a macro, or aggregate, evaluation
of the uses and effects of medical technology and the other, a micro, or
individualised, evaluation of the applications of this technology. At the macro level
of consideration the central inquiry is: Should scientific discovery be given unlimited
licence or should it be restrained? At the micro level, the question becomes: How
should the benefits of medical technology be parcelled out or rationed?
No doubt one of the foremost Australian jurisprudents of his day, Julius Stone,
addressed the issue of social responsibility in science in a 1973 lecture entitled,
'Knowledge, Survival, and the Duties of Science'. 12 He advanced the proposition
that 'scientists have a duty to exercise self-restraint in pressing further those
scientific activities which manifest' a likelihood that they will result in 'limit
situations' or, in other words, 'dangers of cataclysmic physical or psychological
proportions for mankind as a whole'. 13 Scientific self-restraint should be imposed
only when a scientist is 'clearly able to foresee that the particular line of work is
leading to a kind and scale of dangers constituting a "limit situation"'. 14 While
acknowledging a predisposition 'in favour of the traditional freedom of the
science', 15 Stone had grave reservations about the feasibility of in vitro
fertilisation as well as genetic surgery and engineering. 16 He viewed such
'17 Today, Stone
interventions as 'formidable dangers to a liberty-based society ...
utopian and
cosmic
a
middle-of-the-road
as
would, no doubt, be classified
of science, so long as they do
catastrophist; one willing to embrace the wonders
18
not endanger mankind at the cataclysmic level.
8 See generally Michael Kirby, 'Law Reform as "Ministering to Justice"' in Anthony
Blackshield (ed), Legal Change: Essays in Honour of Julius Stone (1983).
9 Ibid.
10 George P Smith, II, The New Biolog: Law, Ethics, and Biotechnologv (1989) at 1-13.
11 Ibid. See Arthur L Caplan, Am I M, Brother 's Keeper? The Ethical Frontiers of Biomedicine
(1997) at190-193.
12 Julius Stone, 'Knowledge,Survival, and the Duties of Science' (1973) 23 American U LR 231.
13 Idat240.
14 [bid.
15 Idat258-259.
16 Idat 258.
17 Idat258.
'The Province and Function of Law, Science and Medicine:
18 See generally George P Smith, II,
Leeways of Choice and Patterns of Discourse' (1987) 10 (2)UNSWLJ 103.
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Ethical Relativism?

In order to guide scientific study and advancement, a standard of ethical relativism
is suggested; one which recognises that moral values are in no way absolute, but
rather determined by certain variables 'usually of social phenomena' 19 and a
standard which nevertheless incorporates the value of ethical responsibility.
Others have suggested that ethics is neither relative nor subjective. 20 Rather, it
is asserted, ethical conduct is universal and forces the individual - in this present
context of analysis, the medical scientist - to choose a course of action that has
the 'best consequences', on balance, for all affected. 2 1 In a very real way, then, this
approach advocates a form of utilitarianism. Yet, it is different from classical
utilitarianism in that 'best consequences' is defined as what, 'on balance, furthers
the interests of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure and
22
reduces pain'.
Rather than be straight-jacketed by an a priori ethic of the type Stone advanced,
which would have the practical effect of ceasing the development of scientific
knowledge in many areas, what is needed is an ethic shaped by the particular
situation of present investigation. 23 Such an ethic recognises the needs of the
medical and biotechnological sciences to provide humane and technologically
appropriate (that is, reasonable) care for the sick and minimise human suffering,
prizes the value of genetic improvement and the corresponding elimination of
inheritable disease, 24 as well as embracing an understanding of the need for
economic fairness in the distribution of the benefits of science.2 5 The situation
ethic is grounded in an ungirding or inherent force which directs ultimate actions
be undertaken with love, kindness and humanness which, in turn, advance and
preserve human dignity.

3.

The March of Science

Medical technology is so uniquely powerful that its impact is felt not only in daily
life, but also in the way life is viewed. For example, the technology of mechanical
ventilators, combined with heart transplantation, brought a societal re-examination
of how death should be defined and led to the conclusion that the death of the entire
brain is equivalent to, for all purposes, death of the whole person. This new

19
20
21
22
23
24

Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (1965) at 227-262.
Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (2000) at 9-1I.
Ibid.
Id at 17.
See generally Joseph Fletcher, Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work (1967).
George P Smith, II, *Genetic Enhancement Technologies and the New Society' (2000) 4
Medical Law Internationalat 85: George PSmith, II. 'Eugenics and Family Planning: Exploring
the Yin and the Yang' (1984) 8 U Tas LR 4 at 4-6.
25 George P Smith, II, Genetics, Ethics and the Law (1981) at 2. See also George P Smith, II,
'Biomedicine and Bioethics: De Lege Lata. De Lege Ferenda' (1993)9 J Contemp Health Land
Policy 233: George P Smith. I1, 'Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential Conundrums'
(1976) 64 Geo LJ697.
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definition, in turn, allowed the 'harvesting' of hearts and other vital organs from
both
individuals who, although dead under a brain death criteria, continued to have
26
circulation and respiration maintained artificially by medical ventilation.
While Americans might decide to limit 'halfway' or exotic, science-fiction
inspired technologies, such as artificial hearts or brain transfers into robot bodies,
it would appear unlikely they would ever approve limitations on medical research
whose focus is to discover technologies, drugs, and scientific techniques which not
only maintain qualitative existence, but extend life. The reason for this position is
a life that
simple and direct: 'there is no coherent argument for arbitrarily ending
27
could be prolonged with reasonable quality at a reasonable price.'
In recent months, the public has been almost overwhelmed with scientific
information regarding the genome, the complexities of gene therapy and stem cell
research.28 Yet to come will be efforts to grow certain tissues for grafting,
including skin, bladder and cartilage. Reportedly, cultured cells have been used
successfully in an experimental setting to treat stroke victims. It is expected that
similar cells can be used to treat other disabling brain diseases. Genomics-derived
drugs hold the potential to expand greatly the range of treatments achievable with
human cells, because of their ability to control the cells as they grow and
specialise. 29 Even more opportunities for regenerative medicine will be charted
when the insights from the clonal experiment with Dolly the sheep are realised,
the genetic clock inside a cell and, subsequently, without the
first with a re-set of
30
need for egg cells.
Cases in Point: Achievements or Potential Catastrophes?
Three recent startling scientific achievements both bring into clear focus and,
indeed, test the extent to which - if any - restraints should be imposed upon
medical technology.

A.

26 George J Annas, Standard of Care: The Law ofAmerican Bioethics (1993) at 252-253.
27 Id at 216. See generally George P Smith, II, 'Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility:
Safeguarding Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment' (1996) 12
J Contemp Health L and Policy I George P Smith, 11, 'Stop, in the Name of Love!' (1990) 19
Anglo-American LR 55.

28 See Caplan, above nil at 181-193; Michael Kirby, 'The Human Genome' in Through the
World's Eye (2000) at 41-51; George P Smith, II, 'Harnessing The Human Genome Through
Legislative Constraint' (1998) 5 European J of Health L 53; Symposium, 'Human Primordial
Stem Cells' (1999) 29 (2) Hastings Ctr Rpt 30; Geoffrey Carr, 'Survey: The Human Genome,
The Economist (I July 2000).

29 William A Haseltine, 'Genomics: The Path Ahead for Science, Medicine and Society' (2001)
19 Brookings R20 at 22-23.
30 Ibid; see also Chet Fleming, If We Can Keep a Severed Head Alive .. : Discorporation and US
Patent 4,666.425 (1988); George PSmith, 11,Medical-Legal Aspects of Cryonics: Prospects for
Immortality (1983); Robert Bahr, 'A New Ethical Question: Head Transplants?' (1977) Science
Digest (May) 76. See generally George JAnnas, 'The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and Other
Millennial Myths: The Prospects and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering' (2000) 49 Emory
LJ753.
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(i) Designing Human Viruses
The shadowy world of designer pathogens was brought to the forefront when
Australian scientists created, accidentally, a virus that kills mice by crippling their
immune systems. A startling warning came with this discovery: it may pose as a
threat or precursor to deadlier forms of human viruses and new kinds of biological
weapons. Since humans have the same immune system gene as mice (interleukin4) to control immune
responses, 'in theory a similar step could create a pathogen
31
deadly to people'.
(ii) ANDi
Since 1976, when the first gene-altered animal - a mouse - was created, other
successes with fruit flies, rabbits, sheep, goats, cattle, pigs et cetera have been
recorded. In October 2000, however, the first altered primate, a rhesus monkey
named ANDi, was created. He was made by splicing jellyfish genes into eggs of
rhesus monkeys. Although the technique did not work completely, the jellyfish
gene can be found throughout ANDi's cells. This process gives some credence to
ethical fears scientists may one day use similar techniques to add desirable traits
to human embryos thereby heralding an era of designer babies. Yet, it also brings
the hope of producing animals with genes that cause Alzheimer's disease, breast
cancer, hereditary blindness and other ailments so that, in turn, therapies and
32
vaccines can be tested.
(iii) Cloning Human Embryos
The British Parliament enacted legislation relaxing the rules limiting research on
human embryos under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK).
Taking effect 31 January 2001, the legislation continues the prohibition on creation
of babies by cloning, but allows research on stem cells and mandates the
33
destruction of the clones after 14 days of development.
Stem cell research involves, inevitably, embryo cloning because physicians
want to treat their ill patients with cells from their own bodies. After alteration, the
cells would be cloned and returned to the patient in order to replace damaged or
dead cells causing illness.34 The process requires the removal of the nucleus of a
donor egg and its replacement with a cell from an ill patient. The egg would then
be induced to divide and start growing into an embryo. The cloned cells would be
identical, genetically, to the patient's and therefore could overcome, theoretically,

31 William J Broad, 'Australians Create a Deadly Mouse Virus' New York Times (23 Jan 2001) at
A6.
32 Rick Weiss, 'Scientists Create First Genetically Altered Monkey' Washington Post (12 Jan
2001) at Al ; see also Robert P Lanza, Betsy L Dresser & Philip Damiani, 'Cloning Noah's Ark'
(2000) 283 Scientific American 84.
33 Emma Ross, 'Britain Legalizes Cloning Human Embryos' Washington Times (23 Jan 2001) at
A I: Philip Webster & Greg Hurst, 'MPs Give Go Ahead for Embryo Research' The Times (20
Dec 2000) at I.
34 Ibid.
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problems of transplant rejection. 35 In the United States, early stage embryonic
stem cells are obtained from either the donated 36
or purchased embryos produced in
private laboratories, especially fertility clinics.
In all three of these new scientific breakthroughs, caution must be taken to
exercise - with a spirit of humanism - their capabilities. Misuse surely, in the'
37
words of Julius Stone, holds the real potential for 'cataclysmic' consequences.
Yet, the potential for minimising human suffering exceeds - on balance - the
fear of the negative. Indeed, it could be argued that failure to pursue the scientific
limits of these three achievements would be irresponsible. Both the long and the
short term costs and fears (for example, economic, social, ethical) of placing a
moratorium on scientific inquiries of this nature do not outweigh the untold
medical benefits accruing to society from their pursuit and development. In a
word, pursuing these three breakthroughs is reasonable.

4.

Micro Considerations

The American health care system has been termed, 'technologically-driven, [and]
death-denying'. 38 So long as individuals persist in their desire to live as long as
possible, the frontiers of medical science will always be expanding. 39 While
marginal improvements may be recorded at the end stage of life, these
improvements may be worthless qualitatively to the patient and, indeed,
'extraordinarily expensive to society'. 40 Costs can never be contained until
mortality is accepted, 4 1 and 'despair and rage at the finitude of human existence'
is dispelled.42 Designing a socially acceptable set of normative standards for
dispensing health care is the challenge for contemporary society.
A.
Gatekeeping
The primary gatekeepers to national expenditures for health care are the physicians.
It is they who either limit or facilitate not only medical tests, but treatment
and
43
consultations as well as initial admissions to various health care institutions.
35 Mona S Amer, 'Breaking the Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and its
Implications for a Right to
Individuality' (1996) 43 UCLA LR 1659: George P Smith, II,
'Intimations of Immortality:
Clones, Cryons and the Law' (1983) 6 UNSWLJ 119: see Rick Weiss, 'US Fertility
Expert
Announces Effort to Clone a Human: Consortium Led by Renegade Doctor Says it Will Help
Infertile Couples' Washington Post (27 Jan 2001) at A3.
36 See Rick Weiss, 'Fetal Cell Research Funds Are at Risk: Scientists Fear Curbs Over Abortion'
Washington Post (26 Jan 2001) at A3: Rick Weiss, 'Panel Drafts Ethics Plan for Embryo Cell
Studies: Rules Would Guide Federally Funded Research' Washington Post (9 April 1999) at A2.
37 Above ni2 at 240.
38 Above n26 at 211.
39 Idat 214.
40 Ibid.
41 Idat 216.
42 Daniel Callahan, Setting Linits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society (1987) at 66.
43 Edmund D Pellegrino, 'Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping' (1986) 2 J
Coniemp Health L and Policy 23: 'The Physician's Role in Cost Containment' (1996) 3 J of
Critical Care Nutrition 40.
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The physician assumes one of three roles as a gatekeeper: the de facto function,
which sets a responsibility to practise rational medicine or medicine which is
beneficial and effective for the patient; negative gatekeeping, under which a form
of prepayment system requires the physician to limit the use of health care
services; or as a positive gatekeeper, where he or she encourages the use of health
44
care services and facilities for either corporate or personal profit.
B.

Allocatingand Rationing Health Care
Regardless of which of these three roles are assumed by the gatekeepers, primary
issues of allocation and rationing are central to all of them; for health care involves
a competition for limited resources and therefore - at one level or other- forces
a cost-benefit approach which balances reasonable individual needs against the
availability of medical resources. 4 5 In the face of ever mounting distribution costs,
it is the elderly, in specific, who become major players in the health care drama for
which they are cast in alternating roles as victims and as villains.46 The health care
system helps to prolong their lives, yet at the same time, puts more and more
dollars into geriatric spending.47 The ethical issue implicit here involves the fair
48
distribution of public resources among the different age groups.
(i)

Allocations

Interestingly, in England, the practice of allocating resources based upon age stems from
a paternalistic system that gives greater deference to its physicians who are then able to
directly influence patient choices.49 The allocation of health care resources 4involves a
societal determination of what resources should be devoted to a particular program'.5°
Perhaps the best examples of age-based allocation schemes are to be found in the
experiences of other countries, where cost containment initiatives result in indirect
limits on care for the elderly.5 1 The cost-benefit approach to the distribution of
health care resources is impractical - from an ethical viewpoint - because it seeks
to reduce (or convert) all health benefits to dollar amounts, thereby seeking very
52
awkwardly to convert quality of life benefits into unyielding economic terms.

44 lbid. see also Edmund D Pellegrino. 'Managed Care at the Bedside: How Do We Look in the
Moral Mirror?' (1997) 7 Kenned, hist Ethics J 321: Edmund D Pellegrino. 'Patient and
Physician AUtonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient
Relationship (1994) 10 J Contemp Health L and Policy 47: see generally Robert B Pippin.
'Medical Practice and Social Authority in James L Nelson & Hilde L Nelson (eds), Meaning
and Medicine: A Reader in the Philosophy of Health Care (1999).
45 See Daniel Callahan. 'What is a Reasonable Demand oii Health Care Resources? Designing a
Basic Package of Benefits" (1992) 8 J Conteinp Health L and Policy I.
46 See Harry R Moody. Ethics in an Aging Society (1992) at 4.
47 Ibid.
48 Id at 5: see George P Smith. II. Legal and Healthcare Ethics for the Elderly (1996) at 25-34.
49 Above n46 at 197.
50 George P Smith. II. 'Our Hearts Were Once Young and Gay: Health Care Rationing and the
Elderly' (1996) 8 FlaiL & Pub Policy I at 9.
51 Above n46 at 205.
52 John McKie. Helga Kuhse, Jeff Richardson & Peter Singer. 'Allocating Healthcare by QALYs:
The Relevance of Age" (1 996) 5 Camb O Healthcare Ethics 534.
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One method proposed as a solution to this inequality of the cost-benefit
analysis seeks to evaluate the quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) produced for
each available health care dollar.53 The goal of this resource allocation strategy,
then, is to maximise the most QALYs for each available health care dollar. 54 There
is a central weakness to this method, however, because considering the limited
remaining life years of the elderly - individually and as a group - and
calculating their QALYs are highly problematic. Thus, for example, a group of
elderly individuals needing a surgical procedure will not fare as well using the
QALY approach as a younger group of patients - this being rather obvious
inasmuch as the older patients in the group have fewer remaining years to live.
(ii) Rationing
Health care rationing is the fair distribution of limited resources by limiting the
availability of various programs and services.55 A concern with rationing, the
planned distribution of limited resources, is devising a system that is fair and
equitable. 56 In the current American health care system, the ability-to-pay is used
as an implicit rationing device; yet, a lack of consensus in values and norms
prevents a specific method from being developed to achieve the ends of rationing
health care services. 57 'Thus, the debate is no longer
whether health care should be
58
rationed, but rather, how to ration it equitably.'
Health care decisions, in the control of third-party payers, have distorted the
ability to make real choices. 59 Cost containment issues in geriatric health care have
also changed the role of physicians, and forced them, as seen, to become reluctant
medical gatekeepers. 60 Inherent in health care decisions is the conflict between
saving costs and obtaining quality health care. 6 1 In essence, 'rationing has come to
represent discrimination
in access to health care services on the basis of
62
socioeconomic status.'

53 Ibid.
54 See id at 535 ('If health program A has the potential for producing more QALYs than health
program B for a given cost, then program A should be a higher priority for funding') above n48
at 30-32.
55 See above n50 at 10- 11 relating rationing to health care needs.
56 Dorothy C Rasinski-Gregory & Miriam Piven Cotler, 'The Elderly and Health Care Reform:
Needs, Concerns, Responsibilities and Obligations' (1993) 21 West St U LR 65 at 83.
57 See id at 83-86, noting the possibility of many different criteria such as age, disease, and
entitlement.
58 Above n50at 17.
59 Above n46 at 39.
60 Above n43; Edmund D Pellegrino. 'The Commodification of Medical and Health Care: The
Moral Consequences of a Paradigm Shift from a Professional to a Market Ethic' (1999) 24 J of
Med & Philosophy 243.
61 See Joanne Lynn. 'Ethical Issues: Equitable Distribution and Decision Making' in Marshall
Kapp, Harvey Pies & A Edward Doudera (eds), Legal and Ethical Aspects of Health Care for
the Elderly (1985); see also Edmund D Pellegrino, 'Metaphors, Managed Care and Morality'
(1995) 3 J of Critical Care Nutrition 40.
62 Above n50 at II.
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Rationing must be viewed as more than limiting care, for it is a means of
providing care where resources are managed and preserved. 63 Rationing is also
access control, which is dependent on the medical good, the patient's values, and
the needs of society itself.64 Here, justice involves a constant balancing between
65
the good of the individual and the needs and good of society.
In the 1980s, several ethicists became noted proponents in favour of rationing
resources based on age. Callahan boldly proposed a working model based on
distributive justice and an individual's life span, where chronological age became
the dispositive factor in cutting off health care resources. 66 Others have also
67
suggested similar denials of treatment based upon an individual's age.
The moral and social costs of age-based rationing are indisputably very high,
as 'the elderly [would] receive less than their economic due as a return on their
prior investment to society'. 6 8 Indeed, the harshest criticism against rationing is
seen in the misperception that health care will be withheld or withdrawn based
69
solely on economic decisions.
Rationing health care to the elderly is based traditionally upon a cost-benefit
analysis that views the elderly as poor investments per health care dollar, or a use
of scarce resources with limited returns. 70 The basic argument advanced here is
that other segments of the population have more of a potential return on the
investment of health care dollars than the elderly. 7 1 Rationing does not mean
necessarily the withholding of all medical care. Instead, expensive treatments
should be abandoned when the chances of positive, rehabilitative results are
minimal. 72 Thus, the primary negative for age-based rationing is the demeaning
73
notion of placing a monetary value on an elderly person's life.
63 See David C Thomasma, 'The Ethical Challenge of Providing Healthcare for the Elderly' (1995)
4 Camb Q Healthcare Ethics 148 at 152.
64 See id at 155, noting that the physician and patient must negotiate the good to be accomplished.
65 Ibid.
66 Above n42 at 49; see also Daniel Callahan, 'On Turning 70: Will I Practice What I Preach?'
(2000) 127 (15) Commonweal at 10, re-arguing that expensive, short-term, life-extending
technological rescues from impending death should be resisted steadfastly by the elderly (for
example, from age 65 to the early 80s) but only if and when the point arises in America where
the health-care maintenance costs of the elderly become so insupportable that they are 'depriving
younger people of what they need to live decent lives and to have a chance of becoming old'.
67 Robert M Veatch, 'Justice and the Economics of Terminal Illness' (1988) 18 Hastings Cir Rep
34 at 39, suggesting that the old have already consumed more than their fair share of resources;
see also Henry J Aaron & William B Schwartz, The Painful Prescription: Rationing Hospital
Care (1984) at 34-37, documenting the withholding of kidney dialysis treatment based on age.
68 Above n56 at 90.
69 Above n63 at 149.
70 Andrew H Smith & John Rother, 'Older Americans and the Rationing of Health Care' (1992)
140 UPa LR 1847 at 1849-1850.
71 Idat 1853.
72 Id at 1850, see also George P Smith, II, 'Triage: Endgame Realities' J Contemp Health L and
Policy (1986) 143 at 149, suggesting that love and humaneness serve as guides to determine
when treatment cease - this, tested against the ability of the patient to engage in or sustain
human relationships.
73 See above n50 at 14.
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Chronological age alone, as the determinative factor, fails as a practical
approach in making health care decisions because of the great 'divergence between
theory and practice'. 74 Instead, other variables, such as quality of life and health
factors, are as equally important in determining treatment for the elderly.7 5 The
utilitarian view of health care advocates balancing many different factors, such as
public and private benefits, predicted cost savings, risks involved and necessary
trade-offs. 76 In contrast, others argue a functional approach to rationing where the
77
functional status of the person takes precedence over any utilitarian balancing.
No doubt, the best gatekeeping ethic is to be found in the inherent physicianpatient relationship - a relationship based on mutual trust and access to health
care information, which then allows treatment to be consistent with a patient's
preferences or recovery potential. 78 The major factor in addressing health care
rationing should not be age. Rather, the course of a patient's treatment should be
dependent solely upon his or her individual medical condition, 79 and shaped
always by the goal of humane, loving care which reduces human suffering,
as safeguards the dignity of the human spirit,
enhances the common good, as well
80
especially in end-game situations.
C.
GenerationalJustice
concept
of intergenerational equity arises from the association between the
The
increased number of persons over 65 years, the probability that they are frequently
using health care resources, and the resultant increase in health care costs. 81 The
government is not able to bear, without restraint, the growing social and economic
health care costs associated with the elderly. In America, during the presidency of
Ronald Reagan, federal funding failed to keep pace with demand, as the demand
for resources far out-distanced the available supply. 82 Every dollar given to the
program for the elderly meant one less dollar for other groups. Addressable
economic issues included then, as now, the proper delivery of care, the allocation
of resources, effective and affordable methods of insurance, and defining research
83
priorities.
The fastest growing population in the United States and worldwide are people
over the age of 65.84 'A corresponding shrinkage occurs in the population under
74 Above n46 at 190.
75

See id at 189.

h
76 See Tom I. Beauchamp & James F Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics ( 4 t ed. 1994) at
47-55.
77 Above n63 at 157. explaining that a Ihll functioning human person - 'status one' - has all
treatment 'open for discussion'. whereas an individual suflering firom endstage Alzheimer's disease
- *status tour" - has 'only methods of supportive care and ... nutrition ... open for discussion'.
78 Above n56at 91.
79 See above n70 at 1856.
80 See Smith. II. 'Stop. in the Name of Love!'. above n27 at 60. 70-71.
81 See above n56 at 93.
82 Lawrence A Frolik & Alison P Barnes. 'An Aging Population: A Challenge to the La%"( 1991)
42 Hastings IJ 683 at 707-709.
83 Above n42 at 117.
84 See above n63 at 148-149.
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65 years-of-age who will have to bear the burdens of providing for the prior and
the future generations'. 85 Furthermore, the elderly are disproportionate consumers
of health care as hospitalisation of elderly persons on the average
costs three times
86
more per health care dollar than those under 65 years of age.
There is some merit to the argument, however, that the elderly must be
compensated for their work earlier in life and not be required to make additional
health care sacrifices. 87 Due to their advanced years, the elderly earn some degree
of public sympathy and respect because of what they have accomplished before
approaching the end of their lives. 88 In coming to this end, they have discharged
already many of the obligations that society
has required and should not bear a
89
disproportionate burden in their later years.
Arguably, there is a shared inter-generational duty between both the elderly and
those who are younger. Assurances against neglect and abuse come from the moral
obligations and relationships that the young have with the elderly.90 At the same
time, the elderly are stewards of a world they helped fashion and their purpose
should be to aid the young and future generations to come. 9 1 Therefore, the proper
role for all societal groups should recognise a life cycle where the elderly have
come before the young and made life easier for those who follow, while the young
have the burden of supporting the elderly when they are unable to take care of
themselves. The extent of that burden remains the open and truly vexatious
question of this century.

5.

DeliberativeDemocracy

As advances in medicine and technology continue and, as a consequence of this,
social, economic and legal conflicts arise, a central concern becomes whether there
is a proper foundation upon which informed debate and decision-making can
proceed. Deliberative democracy has been popularised and9 2 advanced as the
cornerstone upon which informed decision-making can occur.
As a concept, deliberative democracy seeks to expand the number of forums
where citizen participation can take place - with mutually respectful decisionmaking being the aspirational goal. 93 The best example of this conception in action

85 Id at 148.
86 Ibid.
87 See id at 156, noting that the elderly are responsible for having built 'the roads and bridges,
symphonies, and schools we now enjoy'.
88 Above n82 at 713.
89 See above n63 at 156, quoting, 'While the elderly may gobble up inordinate relative amounts of
healthcare dollars, while doing so, they are not using other resources of society - general
resources use equalises out in the end'.
90 See above n42 at 83, noting familial relationships and governmental such as Social Security and
Medicare.
91 ld at 82.
92 See Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 'Deliberating About Bioethics' (1997) 27 Hastings
Cntr Rep (3) at 38.
93 Id at 40.
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is to be seen in Oregon's efforts in the early 1990s to set priorities for publicly
funded health care under Medicare. 94 Initially determined by the Oregon Health
Services Commission, the list of priorities was shaped by what was viewed as
harsh utilitarian cost-benefit calculations. 95 As a response to heavy public
criticism of the process, a comprehensive plan was developed which, in turn,
allowed the Commission to meet widely with the community through open
by the Commission and a revised
meetings. Further deliberations were undertaken
96
approved.
and
promulgated
up,
drawn
list was
While deliberative democracy is viewed in theory as an attractive complement
to the legislative process, the major drawback to its effective implementation is a
simple realisation: namely, that the average, ordinary American (or, for that matter,
world citizen) is not sufficiently sophisticated or informed to enter into meaningful
dialogue on the limits and uses of the new Age of Medical Science. All too often,
logic is put on 'hold', while unfounded fear and emotional feelings shape the
debate. 97 Similarly, economic realities are repeatedly ignored or postponed until a
than would
time when their forced implementation causes more discord and havoc
98
priority.
order
first
a
as
considered
been
had
they
if
occurred
have
Even with an ethic of openness within a deliberative democracy, the
insuperable obstacle to an informed and constructive debate is the inability of the
public to understand the language of the scientists, that is, the language of
statistics. 99 Yet polls are a popular way to gauge public opinion - informed or
uninformed, as the case may be. Often they are used as barometers by legislators
and judges when trying to shape new responsive laws and set new public policies.
One such survey is of particular relevance.
In 1996, Environics, a Canadian polling firm, contacted 25,000 people in 30
countries and asked their response to two questions: whether they strongly
favoured, somewhat favoured, strongly opposed or somewhat opposed applying
biotechnology to develop medicine and treatments for human diseases; and, if
animals were cloned to produce new biotechnology medicines to fight human
diseases, would they strongly favour, favour somewhat, strongly oppose or
94 The Oregon health care rationing plan was crafted on the basis of what medical problems would
be covered rather than who was to be covered. W John Thomas, 'The Oregon Medicaid
Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy, and The Fate of a Utilitarian Health Care
Program' (1993) 72 Or LR at 47.
95 Idat 153.
96 Above n92 at 41: see also Eric L Robinson, 'Special Project: The Oregon Basic Health Services
Act: A Model for State Reform?' (1992) 45 Vanderbuill LR 977, noting that the use of
community values enhances the effectiveness of medical services.
97 George P Smith, 11,'Judicial Decision making in The Age of Biotechnology' (1999) 13 Notre
Dame JL Ethics and Pub Policy 93 at 93, 103.
98 See Stephen F Williams, 'Limits to Economics as a Norm for Judicial Decisions' (1997) 21
t
Ha'v JL and Pub Policy 39: see generally Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law ( 5 h
ed. 1998).
99 See Robert Schwartz, 'Genetic Knowledge: Some Legal and Ethical Questions' in David C
Thomasma & Thomasine Kushner (eds). Birth to Death: Science and Bioethics (1996) at 25: see
also Jane Gregory & Steve Miller. Science in Public Communication. Culture and Credibili '
(1998) at 249: Albert R Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (1998) at 367-371.
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somewhat oppose the use of biotechnology? To the first question, 78 per cent of
the respondents in the Australian survey answered either strongly in favour or
somewhat in favour of pursuing biotechnology to advance medical science - with
90 per cent of the Americans answering similarly. In response to the second
question, only 38 per cent of the Australians declared themselves as strongly or
somewhat in favour of cloning animals for developing new biotechnology
- while 47 per cent of the Americans surveyed expressed similar
medicines
°°
views.1

6.

Conclusion

Richard Epstein has concluded that 'simple and compact' common law rules are a
far more effective tool for providing health care than endless sets of legislative and
judicial innovations.101 And at the heart of the common law lies the normative
standard of reasonableness, which is forever tested by applying a deceptively
simple balancing test - a test that measures the gravity of the harm of a decision
02
against the social utility or values of maintaining the status quo under challenge.
In the contest of the distribution of health sciences, this approach forces 1an
03
evaluation of the balance of competing individual interests or social values.
Accordingly, the value and cost to society of expending scarce health care
resources, for example, to maintain individuals who have a futile medical
prognosis, is balanced against the economic utility of providing care to those
whose health care can be restored or rehabilitated. 10 4 Age, as well, should not be
seen as the determinative factor in the health care services balancing test. Rather,
a patient's condition, informed or negotiated consent to treatment, and primary
physician's professional judgment as to the need for the commencement or
cessation of medical services should be controlling. 10 5 What is the most
efficacious and humane treatment and in a patient's best interests - while varying
from situation to situation - is nonetheless a medical judgment. 01 6 When that
judgment to withdraw or withhold care may be called into question by a patient's
family, for example, the preferred avenue for resolving disagreement should

100 Dita Smith. What on Earth?' Washington Post (20 Jan 2001) at A21. see generally Bruce
Alberts. -Biomedical Research in the Next Century' in C Everett Koop, Clarence E Pearson &
M Roy Schwarz (eds). Critical Issues in Global Health (2001) at 287.
101 Richard A Epstein. Mortal Peril: Our hIalienableRight to Health Care? (1997) at 23.
102 See Restatement. Second. Torts (1977) §822.
103 Patrick M McFadden, 'The Balancing Test' (1988) 29 Boston College LR 585 at 585, 601.
'Utility and The Principles of Medical Futility', above n27: George P Smith. 11.
104 See Smith. I1.
*Re-thinking Euthanasia and Death with Dignity: A Transnational Challenge' (1990) 12 Adel
LR 480: see also Michael D Kirby. "Bioethical Decisions and Opportunity Costs' (1986) 2 J
Contenip Health L and Policy 7:see generally Smith. II. above n72.
105 Negotiated consent supports shared decision making' - although ttot full equality - among
patient. family, surrogate health care decision-maker and physician: Smith. II. above n48 at 48:
see also Harry R Moody. 'From Inlormed Consent to Negotiated Consent' (1988) 28 The
Gerontologist (Supplementary Issue) 64.
above n48 at 75.
106 Smith. II,
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always be resort to a hospital ethics committee. 10 7 Judicial intervention should
only be sought when all else fails.
Restraining scientific inquiry should be limited only to action seen as
unreasonable. Accordingly, an undertaking would be regarded as unreasonable
when the long and short term costs of its effects would outweigh the enduring
benefits that would derive from its study and implementation. Viewed as being not
only an aid to the tragedy of infertility in family planning, but as a tool for
improving the health of a nation's citizens, vital scientific research must continue
in the new reproductive technologies and in efforts to engineer man's genetic
weaknesses out of the line of inheritance. Healthier and genetically sound
individuals have a much better opportunity for pursuing and achieving the 'good
life' - and, in turn, they make a significant contribution to society's greater well
being.
'If democracy is to be more than a myth and a shibboleth in the age of mature
science and technology', 10 8 a new thoughtful and questioning attitude must be
developed - one that, while not viewing scientific discovery with deference and
uncertainty, nonetheless refuses to allow scientific and technological directions to
be set without participation and question. 10 9 If moral ordering is to be of
significance and value in medical-legal decision-making in the 21s t century, a
practical situation ethic - with universality, or worldwide acceptance, as an
underpinning - must be observed. This ethic must accept genetic enhancement as
valid a goal as the reasonable and efficient delivery of humane and technologically
appropriate care for the sick.' 10
Hopefully, in the final analysis, the law will be seen as a new 'culture' capable
of setting and translating standards of normative conduct for this new Age of
Biotechnology which are both practical and understandable by the citizenry.
Ultimately, '[it is for our society to decide whether there is an alternative or
whether the dilemmas posed by modern science and technology ... are just too
painful, technical, complicated, sensitive and controversial for our institutions of
government.' 11
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108 Michael D Kirby. Reform the Law: Essays on the Renewal of the Australian Legal System
(1983) at 238.
109 Ibid; see generally, George P Smith, 11, Bioethics and the Law: Medical. Socio-Legal and
Philosophical Directionsfor a Brave New World( 1993): Leon R Kass, Toward a More Natural
Science: Biology and Human Affairs (1985).
110 See generally George P Smith, I[, Monograph. Genetic Enhancement or Eugenic Improvement:
Controlling the Brave New World( 1999).
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